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I. INTRODUCTION
While the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 (EAA)
prescribe a detailed set of rules, enforced by heavy sanctions, for
United States companies doing business in the Arab world, Con-
gress specifically provided that that legislation was not "to su-
persede or limit the operation of the antitrust . . . laws . . .'
Companies wishing to do business with Arab customers, therefore,
not only run the risk of civil penalties, the loss of their export privi-
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I Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as the EAA] amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2401, et seq. (1970) (amended 1974). For the specific non-preemption language cited
in the text, see EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(4). The reporting requirement also created by the EAA,
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(b)(2), and now the subject of proposed implementing regulations, 42 Fed.
Reg. 65,592 (1977), would appear to provide an ideal monitoring device for those wishing to
spot conduct which might be the subject of an antitrust complaint. Under the proposed
regulations, United States persons are required to report to the Department of Commerce
requests for action contrary to the broad statement of antiboycott policy contained in EAA
sec. 202(b), apparently including requests for action running afoul of the EAA's prohibitions
as well as those falling within its exceptions. This requirement raises possible questions of
self-incrimination with respect to individual persons required to report acts, subjecting them
to criminal prosecution under the EAA or antitrust laws, since it does not appear to be subject
to the explanations relied on to defeat self-incrimination claims in recent Supreme Court
cases. See Andersen v. State of Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (rejecting a self-
incrimination claim on the grounds that the individual's office records were lawfully seized
and the individual "was not asked to say or to do anything"); United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601 (1971) (rejecting a self-incrimination claim with respect to a federal statute requiring
registration of certain firearms on the grounds that use of registration data in criminal pro-
ceedings was restricted); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1970) (upholding, against a fifth
amendment claim, a state statute requiring those involved in auto accidents to report their
names and addresses to police).
For a general discussion of United States regulation of conduct relating to foreign boycotts,
see Saltoun, Regulation of Foreign Boycotts, 33 Bus. LAw. 559 (1978). For a discussion of the
EAA and its irmiplementing regulations, see Ludwig & Smith, The Business Effects of the
Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977-Morality Plus
Pragmatism Equals Complexity, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 581 (1978).
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leges, or even criminal penalties under the EAA, but open them-
selves to potential damage exposure under the antitrust laws as
well. Indeed, the application of both laws to the same facts poses
the very real possibility that conduct permitted by the EAA may
still be challenged by private parties using innovative antitrust
theories and seeking to recover treble damages, as well as attorney's
fees.
This Article will review the complex interrelationship between the
EAA and the antitrust laws and consider the manner in which the
enactment of the EAA might affect a court's application of the
antitrust laws to boycott-related conduct. From this review the au-
thors conclude that the EAA and its implementing regulations re-
flect a congressional resolution of many of the difficult issues arising
from the international context of the boycott, which have been
raised but not always definitively resolved in the slower judicial
evolution of the antitrust laws. For this reason, the provisions of the
EAA and its implementing regulations should be given great weight
by any court faced with related questions under the antitrust laws,
and liability under the antitrust laws generally should not result if
there is no violation of the EAA.
The Article will first briefly sketch the legislative development of
the EAA, its relationship to basic antitrust principles, and the man-
ner in which it resolves the questions of extraterritorial application
and foreign sovereign involvement and then consider the manner in
which a court might make constructive use of the EAA and antitrust
precedents in analyzing (1) issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
(2) defenses relating to the question of foreign sovereign involve-
ment, and (3) the ultimate question of liability. Several hypotheti-
cal fact situations will illustrate the points developed in this review.
II. BACKGROUND
When the Arab boycott of Israel became the subject of heated
public debate in late 1975 and early 1976, the antitrust laws of the
United States were cited by some as providing a legal standard by
which the boycott and its impact on the United States and its
citizens could be judged.2 Section 1 of the Sherman Act has long
I Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and American Responses: Antitrust Law or Executive
Discretion, 54 TEx. L. Rav. 1260 (1976); Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to the Arab
Boycott: Per Se Theory, Middle East Politics, and United States v. Bechtel Corp., 54 TEx.
L. REv. 1411 (1976); Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, 74 MICH. L. REv.
795 (1976); Axinn, Some Antitrust Aspects of the Arab Boycott, N. Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1976, at
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been held to bar concerted refusals to deal, and a United States
manufacturer's refusal to deal with a blacklisted United States sup-
plier in order to satisfy an Arab customer was said to be a straight-
forward example of such conduct.
Indeed, in earlier cases arising in domestic commerce, courts fre-
quently ruled that the adverse effect of concerted refusals to deal
was so obvious as to make them per se illegal, without inquiring
into purpose or justification. And in the case of Arab boycott com-
pliance, some commentators recommended a similar rule of per se
illegality.'
The antitrust laws were, in fact, used as a weapon against the
Arab boycott by the Department of Justice in a suit for civil injunc-
tive relief under the Sherman Act against the Bechtel Corporation,
a major international contractor, and four of its subsidiaries. The
complaint alleged that the Bechtel companies and certain unnamed
co-conspirators4 had implemented the Arab boycott within the
United States by refusing to deal with blacklisted subcontractors
and by requiring eligible subcontractors to agree not to deal with
blacklisted companies.5 The Department of Justice subsequently
negotiated a consent decree which was published for comment in
January 1977.6 As this Article goes to press no action has been taken
by the Court on the proposed decree.
1, col. 1. Several months earlier, the antitrust laws were proposed as a possible remedy against
the Arab states' oil embargo of the United States in a memorandum submitted to the Depart-
ment of Justice by Gulf & Western Industries, 729 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-24 to A-26 (1975).
1 As will be discussed in greater detail later, the courts have not always considered such
conduct per se illegal but have, in a variety of circumstances, concluded that further inquiry
into the reasonableness of the defendant's action was required. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969). In addition, the
Sherman Act recognizes a person's freedom to decide, unilaterally, that he will not deal with
another, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), although the courts have
always examined the surrounding circumstances carefully to be sure there was no implicit
agreement on the defendant's part, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966).
The failure to name the co-conspirators led to speculation that the Department of Justice
regarded the Arab states as co-conspirators with the Bechtel group. Schwartz, supra note 2,
at 1278; Kestenbaum, supra note 2, at 1419. This interpretation of the pleading would appear
to be inconsistent with the position subsequently adopted by the Department of Justice in
its competitive impact statement in the Bechtel case.
United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C 76-99 (GBH) (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
See Competitive Impact Statement of Department of Justice, 42 Fed. Reg. 3,716 (1977);
Defendant's Competitive Impact, reprinted in 142 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY
(BNA) N-i (1977). The Department of Justice recently published written comments on the
proposed decree filed with the court, as well as its responses to those comments. 43 Fed. Reg.
12,953 (1978).
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Congress concluded that the applicability of the antitrust laws to
international boycotts was too uncertain to permit reliance on them
to achieve its antiboycott objectives.7 However, in drafting the spe-
cific antiboycott provisions of the EAA, Congress was forced to con-
front the very issues causing uncertainty under the antitrust laws.
The most basic issue faced both by Congress, and by the Com-
merce Department in issuing implementing regulations, was the
extraterritorial application to be given the new legislation. It was
obvious that some of the conduct which the EAA sought to regulate
might occur outside the United States and might involve foreign
individuals or companies. These factors served both to attenuate
United States claims to regulatory jurisdiction and to strengthen
the jurisdictional claims of other states (such as the situs of the
conduct or the domicile of the foreign parties).
Secondly, the conduct to be regulated might be encouraged, re-
quested, or required by one or more entities which could, with vary-
ing degrees of legitimacy, claim to speak for a foreign sovereign. To
the extent that the Congress sought to subject a private party to a
standard of conduct inconsistent with that imposed by a foreign
sovereign, serious questions of international law and diplomacy
were presented.
Congress ultimately resolved these questions with an approach
that combined a frank opposition to the boycott and a recognition
of the legal and practical limitations on its own jurisdiction to pro-
scribe boycott-related conduct. This approach attempted to tailor
the prohibitions, which are the heart of the act, to reach only the
so-called "secondary" and "tertiary" levels of the boycott while
leaving the "primary" boycott untouched.8 The Senate Finance
Committee described the bill as follows:
[Tihe bill reported by the committee makes certain limited
accommodations to the laws and rights of other nations, including
boycotting nations, with the realization that where rights of na-
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS ON S. 69, S. REP.
No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977) reprinted in 85 DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) B-
8, B-19, 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
I In its report on S. 69, which is substantially identical to the EAA as enacted, the Senate
Finance Committee described the "primary boycott" as the Arab government's refusal to
have, and prohibition of their nationals from having, economic relations with the State of
Israel or Israeli nationals. The "secondary" aspect of the boycott was said to constitute an
attempt "to interfere with economic relations among third parties and the State of Israel as
a means of implementing the primary boycott" while the "tertiary" aspect was said to involve
attempts to "interfere with economic relations among third parties themselves." Id. at 20.
[Vol. 8:661664
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tions conflict, each must make adjustments, however reluctantly,
to avoid confrontations on "principles" which are as strongly op-
posed by others as they are deeply held by the United States. The
goal of the bill is to defend American principles without unneces-
sarily interfering with the rights of others and without creating
conditions which undermine U.S. influence or a settlement in the
Middle East.?
In order to accomplish this goal, Congress limited the extraterri-
torial effect of the legislation by making it applicable only to
"United States persons" and requiring that their conduct occur "in"
United States commerce before the statutory prohibitions became
applicable.'0 The "United States persons" definition effectively con-
fines the Act to United States citizens, corporations, and other legal
entities created under United States law, as well as foreign subsidi-
aries and affiliates controlled by United States companies." The
legislative history suggests that the "in" commerce requirement was
also an effort by Congress to narrow the reach of the statute.'
The adoption of specific exceptions to the Act's prohibitions ad-
dressed the question of the involvement of foreign sovereigns. These
exceptions extend to certain aspects of a United States person's
compliance with a foreign state's immigration, export, import, and
import documentation requirements, as well as to certain types of
compliance with foreign law by United States persons residing in
foreign countries, and to their compliance with unilateral selections
of specifically identifiable goods or services made by foreign per-
sons. 13
Subject to these limitations, however, Congress was concerned,
not only with prohibiting boycott-related discrimination against
United States persons, but also with preventing any United States
person from joining in the concerted efforts to disrupt commerce
with a friendly country or with those doing business with that coun-
try. Not merely a desire to prevent restraints of trade in United
States commerce with Israel, this latter objective obviously re-
Id. at 21.
tO EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1); EAA sec. 204, amending §11 of the Export Administration Act
of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. §2410 (1976).
" Export Administration Regulations [hereinafter cited as EAR] § 369.1(b), 43 Fed. Reg.
3512-13 (1978)(to be codified in 15 C.F.R., pt. 369).
"2 158 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) N-6, N-7 (1977). This report
indicates that that committee rejected the broader "affecting commerce" standard contained
in the House bill and instead adopted the Senate's "in commerce" language.
'" EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2).
1978]
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flected a basic political and foreign relations judgment that foreign
states should not be permitted to enlist the support of United States
persons to make such boycotts effective.
. In sum, the EAA and the implementing regulations reflect a de-
liberate judgment of the legislative and executive branches to bal-
ance United States and foreign sovereign interests in the Arab boy-
cott context. While the antiboycott policy underlying the EAA is not
synonymous with the economic objectives of the antitrust laws, the
manner in which Congress and the Executive resolved the questions
of the extraterritorial scope to be accorded the EAA and the recogni-
tion to be given the interests of foreign sovereigns is highly relevant
to the resolution of similar issues under the antitrust laws.
III. APPLICATION
A. The Antitrust Laws and International Boycotts
The application of the antitrust laws to international boycotts
raises the same questions that arise under the EAA concerning ex-
traterritorial application and the recognition to be given the in-
volvement of a foreign sovereign in the challenged conduct. In addi-
tion, there is the question of the appropriate method of analyzing
Arab boycott-related conduct subject to the strictures of the anti-
trust laws. While the EAA defines in some detail refusals to deal and
other prohibited conduct, the general language of the Sherman Act
requires a judicial analysis of the facts of each antitrust case (al-
though, as noted earlier, the result of that analysis is sometimes the
application of the per se rule of illegality).
To focus on each of these aspects of the antitrust laws, the follow-
ing three hypothetical factual situations are proposed, based on
examples given in Export Administration Act Regulations (EAR):
1. A, a United States exporter planning to sell retail goods to
customers in boycotting country Y, enters into a contract to pur-
chase goods wholesale from B, a United States appliance manufac-
turer. A's contract with B includes a provision stipulating that B
may not use components or services of blacklisted companies in the
manufacture of its appliances."
2. A, a subsidiary of United States company B, is a bona fide
resident of boycotting country Y. A plans to import computer oper-
ated machine tools to be installed in its automobile plant in boycot-
" See EAR § 369.2(a), Refusals to Do Business, Example (viii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3518 (1978).
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ting country Y. The computers are mounted on a separate bracket
on the side of the equipment and are readily identifiable by brand
name. A orders the tools from United States supplier C and specifies
that C must incorporate computers manufactured by D, a non-
blacklisted company. A would have chosen computers manufac-
tured by E, except that E is blacklisted, and Y's import laws pro-
hibit the importation of goods manufactured by blacklisted firms.'5
3. United States construction company A has a contract to build
a school in boycotting country Y. A's employees set up operations
in Y for purposes of commencing construction. A's employees in Y
advise A's headquarters in the United States that Y's import laws
prohibit importation of goods manufactured by blacklisted firms.
A's employees in Y make the decision to issue invitations to bid only
to non-blacklisted firms for certain specifically identifiable goods.'"
B. Extraterritorial Effect
As previously noted, Congress chose to restrict the extraterritorial
application of the EAA by making its provisions applicable only to
"United States persons" and only with respect to their activities
"in" United States commerce. The traditional interpretations of the
antitrust laws, however, have established a potential extraterritorial
scope for those laws considerably broader than that of the EAA. It
is now well established that the Sherman Act applies to restraining
conduct outside the flow of United States commerce, so long as that
conduct has a sufficient adverse "effect" upon United States domes-
tic or foreign commerce.' 7 Indeed, the Alcoa case also establishes
that the Sherman Act is applicable to the conduct of aliens, as well
as United States citizens, although the standard of liability may be
more rigorous in the case of an alien defendant, requiring proof of
some intent to produce the required adverse effect on United States
commerce.'"
Is EAR § 369.3(f-2), Imports for U.S. Person's Own Use, Example (i), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534
(1978).
Id. Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
" Id. at 443-444; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395 F. Supp. 221
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that necessary intent to affect U.S. commerce may be inferred from
other evidence). For recent general discussions of the extraterritoriality question, see Kintner
& Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B. C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 199 (1977); Ongman, "Be No Longer A Chaos:" Constructing a
Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U.L.
REV. 733 (1977).
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Recent pronouncements of the Department of Justice suggest a
heightened sensitivity to the difficult legal and diplomatic issues
posed by the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act and a desire
to reconcile the statutory objectives to potential conflicts with the
laws of foreign sovereigns. Thus, in its recent Antitrust Guide for
International Operations (Guide),'" the Antitrust Division suggests
that
considerations of jurisdiction, enforcement policy, and comity
often, but not always, lead to the same conclusion: the U.S. anti-
trust laws should be applied to an overseas transaction when there
is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States com-
merce; and, consistent with these ends, it should avoid unneces-
sary interference with the sovereign interests of foreign nations2 0
A specific illustration of this enforcement approach is provided by
the Justice Department's proposed consent decree in the Bechtel
case, 2 which purports to enjoin the defendant's implementation of
the Arab boycott within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United
States. In defending its position that the decree should not, and
could not, reach conduct occurring in the boycotting states, the
Justice Department initially reaffirmed that the Sherman Act
would apply to a conspiracy entered into abroad, even if among
foreigners, "if it is capable of effecting a restraint upon, and is
intended to affect United States domestic or foreign commerce. '22
Application of United States law to the boycott "as it operates in
Arab League Countries"2 3 was said to be inappropriate as a matter
of law, enforcement policy, and comity since:
(1) the United States may not be reasonably expected to achieve
compliance by the attempt to impose its own law in conflict with
that of a sovereign jurisdiction;
(2) the illegal conduct is to take place in the territory of the
foreign sovereign; and
(3) the application of United States antitrust law to foreign con-
g Department of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as GUIDE]; see also Remarks by Donald A. Farmer, Jr., Special Assistant
to Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Before the Annual Meeting of the National
Security Industrial Association (May 23, 1977). See also Griffin, Book Review, 8 GA. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 516 (1978).
20 GUIDE, supra note 19, at 6-7.
21 United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C 76-99 (GBH) (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976).
22 Competitive Impact Statement of the Department of Justice, 42 Fed. Reg. 3716-19
(1977).
23 Id.
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duct directly conflicts with foreign law valid in a foreign sover-
eignty thereby imposing substantial hardship upon the one against
whom it would be applied .... 11
Of course, the position of the Department of Justice, while reflect-
ing official enforcement policy, is not binding on private plaintiffs
and does not preclude courts presented with private treble damage
claims from ta1 "ng inconsistent positions. Nevertheless, the Depart-
ment's positioi is the best reflection of the executive branch's as-
sessment of the applicability of the antitrust laws in international
contexts and on that basis alone would appear to be entitled to
considerable judicial deference, even in private antitrust cases.
In any event, at least one federal court has recently expressed
similar views concerning the need to make the "substantial effects"
jurisdictional test more sensitive to enforcement policy and comity
considerations. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,5
after reversing the district court's dismissal of the case on the basis
of the act of state doctrine, the court examined the question of
subject matter jurisdiction and expressed its dissatisfaction with
the Alcoa "substantial effects" test, because it failed to "consider
the other nation's interests" or to "take into account the full nature
of the relationship between the actors and this country.""6 The case
1, Id. See also Remarks by Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General, Before the Inter-
national Bar Association, Business Law Section, Nov. 3, 1977; Remarks by Donald A. Farmer,
Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Before the Semi-
nar on Antitrust Problems and Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America (June 8, 1977)
(Both citing principles of comity as a basis for reconciling conflicting claims of the United
States and foreign sovereigns). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
40 (1965). A somewhat different note is sounded in the Justice Department's recent response
to comments on the proposed Bechtel Decree. In defending the proposed decree, the Justice
Department emphasized that the decree is "consistent with a full reach of United States
Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction under the Anti-Trust Laws" and suggests that the decree may
reach conduct permitted by the Export Administration Amendments. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,953-
57 (1978). Primary emphasis is placed on the EAA provisions relating to the permissible scope
of conduct by United States persons resident in boycotting countries, e.g., EAR § 369.3,
Examples F-1 and F-2.
2 549 F.2d at 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
" The commentators, and to a lesser extent the courts, have also noted another and more
basic limitation of the "effects" test based upon the underlying pu pose of the Sherman Act.
As the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws observed: "defendants
should be allowed to show that due to foreign economic or political barriers, their conduct at
bar was prerequisite to trade or investment in a foreign country." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 83 (1955); P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 128 (2d ed. 1974).
This same perception was expressed in slighly different terms in United States v. Minne-
sota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) where the court con-
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
was ultimately remanded to the district court for reconsideration of
the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Timberlane court suggested that the somewhat mechanical
process of gauging the substantiality of the effect of the challenged
practices be superseded by a "tripartite analysis" in which the fol-
lowing three questions would be examined:
(1) Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect,
the foreign commerce of the United States?
(2) Is it [the restaint] of such a type and magnitude so as to be
cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act?
(3) As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to
cover it?2
The court characterized the third inquiry as one modeled on con-
flicts of laws principles, specifically quoting the language of section
40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, dealing
with limitations on the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction." Under
demned agreements among United States manufacturers to supply foreign markets from
jointly-owned foreign plants as a restraint, inter alia, on potential exports by United States
competitors of the agreeing manufacturers. The court regarded the feasibility of such exports
as established in the case before it but suggested that no liability should result where it was
established that there would be no additional commerce, absent the concerted activity:
It is axiomatic that if over a sufficiently long period American enterprises, as a
result of political or economic barriers, cannot export directly or indirectly from the
United States to a particular foreign country at a profit, then any private action
taken to secure or interfere solely with business in that area, whatever else it may
do, does not restrain foreign commerce in that area in violation of the Sherman Act.
For, the very hypothesis is that there is not and could not be any American foreign
commerce in that area which could be restrained or monopolized.
Id. at 958.
Id. at 615.
2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FORMGN RELATIONS LAw § 40 (1965) provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforce-
ment actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasona-
bly be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state.
670 [Vol. 8:661
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this "jurisdictional rule of reason," a complex set of variables would
have to be considered:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of business or
[incorporation], the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect Ameri-
can commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad. 2
Once these factors were evaluated, the court would be in a posi-
tion to identify the potential areas of conflict which might arise if
United States jurisdiction were asserted and to decide whether the
United States' contacts with, and interests in, the conduct were
"sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction." 30
Such an approach was said to be "especially required" in private
treble damage actions in which "there is no opportunity for the
executive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact, nor any
statement implicit in the filing of the suit that that consideration
has been outweighed."'"
The preceding review suggests that the Sherman Act, unlike the
EAA, is potentially applicable to: (1) "non-United States persons"
and (2) conduct with the requisite "substantial effect" on United
States commerce, even if such conduct is not "in" United States
commerce, as required by the EAA. At the same time, this poten-
tially broad applicability would appear to be limited by an increas-
ing emphasis, both in official enforcement policy and in at least one
important judicial decision, on insuring that the statute as applied
to extraterritorial situations serves statutory objectives, and on min-
imizing interference with the laws and policies of other states having
a legitimate regulatory interest in the situation. The "jurisdictional
rule of reason" expressed by the Timberlane court represents the
most complete expression of this expanded version of the Alcoa
"substantial effects" test and would appear to provide a judicial
vehicle for reconciling the reach of the antitrust laws with that
deemed appropriate by Congress in enacting the EAA.
" 549 F.2d at 614.
, Id. at 614-15.
Id. at 613.
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C. Defenses Based on the Role of Foreign Sovereigns in the Chal-
lenged Conduct
Under both the EAA and the antitrust laws, the participation of
foreign sovereigns in the challenged conduct may provide some insu-
lation from liability under United States law. As noted, the EAA
resolves such claims by excepting from its prohibitions conduct
deemed part of a foreign sovereign's "primary boycott," as for exam-
ple, its attempts to prohibit trade between its own territory and
nationals, on the one hand, and the boycotted state and its nation-
als on the other. These exceptions are cast in terms of permissible
compliance with foreign import and export requirements (insofar as
they prohibit trade with the boycotted countries, their nationals or
residents), permissible compliance with a foreign state's local law
by bona fide residents of that state with respect to the residents'
local activities, and permissible compliance with the unilateral
selection of specifically identifiable goods and services by a boycot-
ting country or a national or resident thereof.32
Judicial construction of the antitrust laws has responded to the
same concerns by shaping certain defenses that are available to both
the foreign sovereign and the involved private parties in situations
where the foreign sovereign's involvement was thought to make ap-
plication of United States antitrust rules inappropriate. Although
these defenses have not received extensive judicial consideration to
date, an examination of the precedents suggests that, properly con-
strued, they should give no less protection to the activities of foreign
sovereigns than the EAA's exceptions.
The most important defense developed by the courts is the act of
state doctrine, which grew out of cases involving the expropriation
of property by foreign states and prevents United States courts from
passing on the governmental acts of foreign states within their own
2 Foreign sovereigns also enjoy some protection from United States juurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976). This protection is
subject to certain exceptions, however, including an exception for the state's "commercial
activities." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) specifically includes any case based on "an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere . . . [that] causes a direct effect in the United States." The categori-
zation of an activity as "commercial" for purposes of this exemption is said by the statute to
turn on "the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). See, Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act
of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 Tax. L. REv. 1 (1976)
(discussing the applicability of the sovereign immunity, act of state and sovereign compulsion
defenses to the boycott situation).
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territories.3 The basic explanation of the doctrine has always been
the courts' concern that their inquiry into such acts of state would
embarrass and frustrate the executive branch in its discharge of its
foreign relations function. As so stated, the doctrine reflects a judi-
cial recognition of the practical limits of United States enforcement
jurisdiction as well as the constitutional principle of separation of
powers .31
This rationale was appropriate in cases challenging foreign expro-
priations since the executive branch was routinely involved in at-
tempting to effectuate a settlement with the foreign state with re-
spect to the claims of United States citizens.35 While the doctrine
11 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). In the Underhill case, a United States
citizen formerly residing in Venezuela sued a Venezuelan citizen for damages alleged to arise
from the Venezuelan's conduct while serving as military chief of the Venezuelan district in
which the plaintiff then resided. In the course of its affirmance of the judgment for defendant
the Court offered the classic statement of the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sover-
eign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means to be availed of by sover-
eign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252.
' In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), the Court stated:
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system
of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense
of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international
sphere.
One aspect of the act of state doctrine not yet resolved by the courts is the extent to which
it is subject to the commercial-governmental distinction embodied in the new foreign sover-
eign immunity statute. See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)
(Justice White suggested that the defense is not available for the commercial acts of a foreign
state). This aspect of the doctrine appears to be of only marginal significance in the Arab
boycott context since the activities likely to be the subject of an antitrust challenge are
generally premised on some requirement of Arab law, e.g., the prohibition on goods manufac-
tured in whole or in part in Israel.
This point was noted in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431-32, where
the Court stated:
Following an expropriation of any significance, the Executive engages in diplo-
macy aimed to assure that United States citizens who are harmed are compensated
fairly. Representing all claimants of this country, it will often be able, either by
bilateral or multilateral talks, by submissions to the United Nations, or by the
employment of political or economic sanctions, to achieve some degree of general
redress. Judicial determinations of invalidity of title can, on the other hand, have
only an occasional impact, since they depend on the fortuitous circumstance of the
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. [Vol. 8:661
might seem to have little relevance in the ordinary antitrust case,
where diplomacy is seldom utilized to effect a solution, the Arab
boycott is more than an antitrust problem. Congress acknowledged
that the paramount role of the United States and the executive
branch in effectuating United States interests in the Middle East
was a reason for carefully defining the scope of its legislative anti-
boycott rules.3e Accordingly, the traditional formulation of the act
of state doctrine would appear to support the same circumspect
approach to the application of the antitrust laws in the Arab boycott
context as is reflected in the EAA's exceptions.
A second defense which has grown out of the act of state doctrine
is the sovereign compulsion defense, intended to protect private
parties from liability for acts which they were compelled to perform
by a foreign sovereign. This defense has been allowed in only one
antitrust case and summarily rejected in several others. 7 Conse-
property in question being brought into this country . . . . Piecemeal dispositions
of this sort involving the probability of affront to another state could seriously
interfere with negotiations being carried on by the Executive Branch and might
prevent or render less favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise be
reached. [Footnote omitted.]
3' SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at B-14.
-v The defense was allowed in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970), where the operator of a United States refinery alleged a con-
certed refusal to deal by two crude oil suppliers operating in Venezuela and a reseller of the
crude (all of whom were subsidiaries of American companies). The court upheld the defen-
dants' claims that they were compelled to cease dealing with the plaintiff by an order of the
Venezuelan government.
By contrast, in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
[1963] TRADE CASES (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, [1965] TRADE CASES
(CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the district court rejected a claim that Swiss legislation
compelled the anticompetitive agreement among the defendant Swiss watch producers, hold-
ing that recognition and approval of the agreement by the Swiss government would not
"convert what is essentially a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable system
resulting from foreign government mandate." Similarly, the defendant in United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), claimed that Mexican legislation compelled the chal-
lenged concerted Sisal marketing activities in the United States but the Supreme Court noted
that the defendant had solicited the legislation and ruled the Mexican laws were merely a
peripheral part of a larger pattern of anticompetitive conduct by the defendant. See Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (private company could not claim
defense with respect to its own acts as government agent).
A related "state action" defense is sometimes allowed in domestic antitrust cases. On the
basis of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which held a state official immune from anti-
trust liability for actions taken pursuant to a state agricultural marketing program, the courts
have in some cases extended the immunity to private parties acting pursuant to state legis-
lative or administrative regimes. E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Autho-
rity, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) has made the availability of this defense to private parties
less certain. While conceding that such a defense might be allowed if the private party's
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quently, the precise nature of the foreign "compulsion" which must
be demonstrated has never been clearly established by the courts.
The EAA's exceptions for compliance with foreign law are, in
effect, a recognition of the same rationale and provide a more spe-
cific articulation of the "compulsion" requirement in the Arab boy-
cott context which should be considered by courts facing similar
questions under the antitrust laws. Thus, while it might be argued
that United States persons can avoid the "compulsion" of Arab laws
by not doing business with Arab customers, the EAA effectively
recognizes that trade with the Arab states is a legitimate activity
of United States persons and that in connection with such trade,
they should be protected from liability for actions which fall within
the recognized jurisdiction of the Arab state and which are taken in
order to comply with the Arab law.38
The EAA, however, carefully defines the permissible reach of
these "foreign legal compulsion" exceptions. While it permits Arab
import law to be used to explain a refusal to deal with an Israeli firm
with respect to an export sale to a boycotting country, the refusal
to deal with a blacklisted person (including a United States sup-
plier) can be justified on the basis of Arab law only where the deci-
sion is made by a United States person residing in the Arab state
with respect to its local activities or where it is a consequence of a
unilateral selection of specifically identifiable goods and services by
a resident of a boycotting country.3
The Justice Department's Guide suggests an analytical approach
which appears quite similar to that on which the EAA exceptions
are premised. Although criticizing the only case in which this de-
fense was allowed (for permitting its invocation with respect to con-
duct within the United States), the Guide acknowleges that "when
an unresolvable and direct conflict between the laws of two coun-
tries imposes substantial hardship upon the affected party, comity
conduct was commanded by the state or if the area in question were subject to pervasive
state regulation, the Court concluded that the state regulatory agency's involvement in the
defendant utility's bulb exchange program was not "so dominant that it would be unfair" to
hold the utility responsible for its implementing conduct and that the application of the
federal antitrust laws to the conduct would not impair the effectiveness of the state regulatory
scheme.
For a general discussion of the issues raised by these defenses, see Baker, Antitrust Reme-
dies Against Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages, and Squeezes: Wandering On The
Road to Mecca, 61 CoRNul L. Rv. 911 (1976); Comment, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion and
the Arab Boycott: A State Action Analogy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1001 (1977).
3 SENATE RsOwr, supra note 7, at B-14.
' EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(C), (F); EAR § 369.3(c), (f), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526-31 (1978).
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may indicate that the laws of the nation with the more important
national interest at stake, based upon its own laws and policies,
should prevail.""
This discussion of the case law suggests that the courts, in enforc-
ing the antitrust laws, have had the same general concerns with the
application of United States law to the conduct of foreign sovereigns
as are reflected in the EAA, although the "exceptions" of the EAA
are obviously more detailed and precise in their application to the
boycott situation than are the antitrust precedents. In both situa-
tions, however, the laws are concerned with advancing the basic
legislative purpose while minimizing conflicts with foreign sover-
eigns, minimizing hardship on private parties who are subject to
unavoidable conflicts between the United States and a foreign state,
and avoiding conflicts with the executive branch in its continuing
discharge of its foreign relations function.
D. Substantive Analysis of the Arab Boycott under the Antitrust
Laws
The EAA differs from the antitrust laws in one important respect
- the specificity with which it and the EAR define the conduct
which it prohibits. The EAA represents a conscientious effort on the
part of Congress and the Commerce Department to describe the
conduct which they regard as illegal. Consequently, once it is deter-
mined that a particular act is within this category, no further analy-
sis is required.
By contrast, the Sherman Act, as well as the other antitrust laws,
are phrased in extremely broad terms and their general prohibitions
can be applied to the facts of a particular case only after a detailed
analysis of those facts on the basis of the pertinent judicial construc-
tions of the Act. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act-the provision
most likely to be involved in any antitrust challenge to boycott-
related activity-the first question which a court must address is
whether the conduct reflects the element of "contract, combination
• . . or conspiracy" required by the statute. Assuming that the nec-
essary agreement is found, analysis defines the nature of that agree-
ment and decides whether the agreement works a sufficiently seri-
ous anticompetitive result to warrant the conclusion of illegality.
40 GUIDE, supra note 19, at 52. In its recent defense of the Bechtel Decree, however, the
Justice Department suggested that the conduct permitted by the EAA exceptions for United
States persons resident in a boycotting country "may ... raise antitrust problems." 43 Fed.
Reg. 12,956 n.11 (1978).
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As already noted, some types of conduct, including many con-
certed refusals to deal, have been characterized as per se illegal;
analysis in those cases stops once it is determined that the agree-
ment is subject to the per se rule. Other cases, including some
involving collective refusals to deal, have applied the traditional
"rule of reason" analysis to the challenged conduct by considering
"the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied
• . the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual and proba-
ble." 4
The first question to be addressed in any judicial analysis of
boycott-related conduct, therefore, is whether there was the neces-
sary element of agreement among the parties to work a restraint on
trade. The Sherman Act clearly does not prohibit unilateral refusals
to deal, although courts will review the surrounding circumstances
carefully to determine whether any agreement should be implied.42
The burden is thus on the plaintiff to establish this element. The
circumstances surrounding the Arab boycott, as well as the provi-
sions of the EAA, suggest two possible obstacles to establishing such
an agreement.
First, in many cases the actions of the United States company in
choosing suppliers may be based on a knowledge of the applicable
foreign law, such as the prohibition on the importation of black-
listed goods, and may not have been accompanied by any explicit
agreement with the Arab customer. In such cases, there may be
serious difficulties in implying any agreement between the Arab
customer and the United States company since the facts suggest,
instead, a unilateral decision to comply with the applicable laws of
the country of importation.
Second, in many other cases, especially after the enactment of the
EAA, it may be the Arab customer who makes the choice of sup-
pliers, excluding those on the blacklist, while the United States
seller implements that decision. The EAA contains a carefully de-
tailed exception from its prohibitions for such implementation by a
41 Id.
41 The leading case on this point is United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
Where the party refusing to deal goes beyond announcements of his unilateral policy, how-
ever, in an attempt to secure the adherence of third parties to that policy, he risks a finding
of combination or conspiracy sufficient to bring his conduct within section 1 of the Sherman
Act. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (where coercion
used to secure compliance). In addition, even a unilateral refusal to deal may run afoul of
section 2 of the Sherman Act when used in an attempt to obtain monopoly power or to
maintain or extend such power. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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United States supplier of a foreign buyer's "unilateral selection" of
specifically identifiable goods and services. 3 A comparable provi-
sion is contained in the proposed Bechtel consent decree. These
exceptions are based, in part, on the absence of any agreement by
the United States supplier in such situations and should be factors
considered by any court applying the antitrust laws to a comparable
factual situation.
Assuming that some element of agreement is found, the precise
nature and terms of that agreement are a matter of the greatest
importance to further analysis. The Supreme Court has broadly
condemned group boycotts, that is, concerted refusals to deal, as per
se illegal but the lower courts have recognized that there are some
situations which warrant analysis under the rule of reason stan-
dard." Accordingly, the characterization of any agreement on the
basis of these precedents will determine whether the court considers
possible justifications for the agreement or merely pronounces it
illegal.
The factual situations in which courts have applied the rule of
reason to alleged concerted refusals to deal are extremely diverse.45
The only generalization which can be derived from them is that they
all involve agreements which the courts concluded had "a primary
purpose and direct effect of accomplishing a legitimate business
objective [with only an] incidental and indirect adverse effect upon
the business of some competitors.""
For example, in a number of these cases, suppliers agreed to des-
ignate a new exclusive distributor, and the courts rejected the Sher-
man Act claims of the terminated distributor on the grounds that
the dealer's exclusion was "merely the incidental result of [the
suppliers'] agreement to transfer their lines" to a new distributor. 7
,1 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(C); EAR § 369.3(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978). Competitive
Impact Statement of Department of Justice, 42 Fed. Reg. 3716 (1977) (Paragaph V(c) of the
Proposed Final Judgment and Justice Department explanation).
" Compare Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (apply-
ing the per se rule) with Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969) (using the rule of reason standard).
'0 See, Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Mackey v.
Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Bridge Corp. of America v. American
Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfers'
Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); College Athletic Placement Service v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, [1975] TADE CAsEs (CCH) 60,117 (D.N.J. 1974), aff'd without
published opinion, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
" United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1972).
17 E.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d at 80.
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Other representative cases have involved refusals by a national
bridge league to sanction local tournaments if the plaintiff's com-
puter was used to keep scores and professional golfers' association's
rules for tournament entry which had the effect of excluding the
plaintiff from tournament play." In all of these situations, the
courts considered the primary objectives of the defendants' actions
to be other than anticompetitive and evaluated the incidental refus-
als to deal which resulted under the rule of reason, ultimately find-
ing for the defendants on the merits.
In another pertinent case, the appellate court upheld a verdict for
defendants charged with a violation of section 1 by reason of their
abandonment of a foreign banana plantation and their discontinu-
ance of the use of plaintiff's adjacent railroad facilities. 9 While
acknowledging the usual per se rule of illegality, the court concluded
that the refusal to deal with the plaintiff was merely an incidental
effect of their decision to abandon the plantation and, therefore,
distinguishable from the cases using the per se rule, which had all
involved "joint refusals to deal by viable business entities which
deliberately and intentionally refused to deal with a trader although
otherwise able. ' 50
On the basis of these precedents, the applicability of the per se
rule to Arab boycott-related conduct appears open to serious ques-
tion. In the first place, it would appear that the primary reason for
a United States exporter's refusal to deal with a blacklisted supplier
is not the simple anticompetitive desire found in the per se cases but
rather a recognition that Arab law precludes its customer from ac-
cepting such goods and that the sale of such a supplier's goods to
such a customer is not possible. In these circumstances, and espe-
cially in view of the role played by foreign legal requirements, it
would be inappropriate for the courts to strike down all Arab
boycott-related refusals to deal without an examination of the sur-
rounding circumstances.
The Guide recognizes this point on a more general level, stating
that "[t]he rule of reason may have a somewhat broader applica-
tion to international transactions where it is found that (1) experi-
ence with adverse effects on competition is much more limited than
in the domestic market, or (2) there are some special justifications
, Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th
Cir. 1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
, International Ry. of Central America v. United Brands, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 241.
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not normally found in the domestic market."'" In other words, even
if a court should conclude that its subject matter jurisdiction should
be exercised and that the substantive defenses discussed are inappl-
icable, the court should carefully consider the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged refusal to deal before holding it unreasonable.
The justification which might be advanced for a refusal to deal
in this context would presumably rely heavily on the role of the Arab
states in the boycott and would describe the resulting supplier selec-
tion as a precondition imposed by foreign law to doing business with
customers in those states. In evaluating the feasibility of less restric-
tive conduct, the court would be forced to grapple with the same
concerns which led Congress to formulate the EAA's specific set of
prohibitions and exceptions - concerns which inevitably require
delicate judgments as to the appropriate extraterritorial scope of
United States law, the consideration of the basis for foreign states'
jurisdiction over the conduct, and the like.
The EAA, in defining the circumstances in which boycott-related
refusals to deal should be permitted, offers an analysis of all of these
factors which should also be considered in assessing the reasonable-
ness of such conduct under the antitrust laws. Thus, as already
noted, the EAA excepts from its prohibitions the actions of a United
States person implementing the boycott-based supplier selection of
a buyer located in a boycotting country where that selection relates
to specifically identifiable goods and services.
In explaining this result, Congress noted that making such con-
duct illegal would challenge the boycotting states "on a point of
obvious sensitivity""2 and would likely result in a diversion of busi-
ness to foreign countries willing to comply with the boycott - a
result which would benefit no one since
[b]lacklisted firms would sell no more goods in the boycotted
country than otherwise, and other U.S. firms would be denied a
'l GUIDE, supra note 19, at 2-3. In support of this proposition, the GUIDE cites K. BREWSTER,
ANTITRUST AND AMERIcAN BUSINESS ABROAD, 79-84 (1958). In discussing possible limits on the
application of the per se rule to foreign commerce cases, Brewster observes:
[T]here are aspects of foreign commerce which may temper the rigor or at least
limit the reach of this per se doctrine. The first is the possibility that the commerce
alleged to be restrained can be proved to have been impossible, even if there had
been no restraint .... [M]ost important ... is the possibility of business justifi-
cations for loose arrangements abroad which may not exist at home, including
foreign legal requirements.
Id. at 88.
2 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at B-14.
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business opportunity which they would otherwise have .... Such
adverse consequences for the United States could erode domestic
support for Israel and undermine solicitude for persons presently
denied business opportunity in the Arab states.13
Other provisions of the EAA exempt a refusal to deal by a United
States person residing in a boycotting country where that refusal is
based on the local laws of the boycotting country and relates only
to the residents' activities within that country. Congress noted
that this exception was based on "recognition of the fact that a
U.S. company with operations in a boycotting country has no choice
but to comply with those import laws if it wishes to continue doing
business in that country."54
The foregoing congressional logic, arrived at after lengthy investi-
gation and debate, should be given substantial weight by any court
required to define the legality of Arab boycott-related refusals to
deal under the antitrust laws. Indeed, if Congress concluded that
there was adequate justification for excepting the foregoing situa-
tions from its specific antiboycott policy, it seems doubtful that any
different result should obtain under the more general economic poli-
cies of the Sherman Act.
In sum, there appears to be a sound basis under the antitrust laws
for application of the rule of reason to conduct allegedly related to
the Arab boycott and subject to the provisions of the EAA. The
policy considerations underlying both the EAA and the evolving
application of the antitrust laws to international transactions sup-
port the appropriateness of such an analysis rather than application
of the rule of per se illegality; and both suggest certain circumstan-
ces in which any resulting restraint should be considered reasona-
ble.
E. Discussion of Hypothetical Factual Situations
On the basis of the foregoing comments, the manner in which the
5Id.
4 Id. at B-15. While purporting to recognize that the application of the antitrust laws to
conduct in the Arab states in compliance with local law would "go far beyond the traditional
scope of United States antitrust enforcement and would be inconsistent both with United
States foreign policy and with the expression of United States congressional policy embodied
in the 1977 amendments," the Justice Department's recent defense of the proposed Bechtel
Decree also observed that "the 1977 amendments and the rules thereunder authorize United
States persons under the guise of compliance with the laws of the boycotting country, to
engage in a plethora of boycotting-implementing activities which would not be permitted
under the decree." 43 Fed. Reg. 12,953-54, 12,957 n.14 (1978).
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antitrust laws might be applied to the three hypothetical cases
drawn from the EAA regulations will be considered. In the first
case, it seems clear that, while A's objective is to export goods to
Y, the real problem is posed by the restrictive provision in a contract
between A and B, two United States companies, relating to the
sale of goods within the United States. As so construed, there would
appear to be no real problem with respect to the extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws. Both A and B are subject to United
States law, the agreement was entered into in the United States,
and it was aimed at preventing certain transactions in the United
States.
The degree of sovereign involvement in the first case may well be
deemed inadequate to support any defense to liability based upon
the act of state or sovereign compulsion doctrines. Since the laws
of Y prohibit importation of blacklisted goods, the Interamerican55
case could be cited for the proposition that the sovereign compulsion
defense is available even where the allegedly compelled acts are
performed in the United States. However, the Interamerican appli-
cation of the defense has been the subject of much critical comment,
and the fact that the EAA does not except this conduct from its
prohibitions strongly suggests that the defense is not likely to be
allowed under the antitrust laws.
As to the merits of a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act
on these facts, it is clear that there is an agreement between the
parties, and an arguable restraint of trade results from the elimina-
tion of a possible export opportunity for blacklisted suppliers. While
it might be argued that the primary purpose of this agreement was
to comply with the laws of country Y, this argument is undercut by
the fact that Y's laws are not, under United States standards of
enforcement jurisdiction reflected in the EAA, permitted to control
A and B's conduct within the United States. Accordingly, the facts
of the first case would appear to present a high level of risk for the
parties under the antitrust laws.
In the second case, although United States supplier E has argua-
bly lost an opportunity to sell its goods for export by virtue of A's
conduct, A's decision was both made and implemented in Y and
was, in fact, the only decision consistent with the laws of Y. Under
the EAR, A's conduct is described as an example of permissible
11 Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970).
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compliance with local law by a bona fide local resident with respect
to its local activities. The Tim berlane jurisdictional "rule of reason"
would appear to suggest that extraterritorial application of the anti-
trust laws was unwarranted as well.
The laws of Y clearly require A to make the supplier selection
described, and Y has a legitimate interest in enforcing those laws
with respect to the local activities of its residents. While the United
States also has an interest in the transaction, it would appear to be
less than that of Y. In any event, it does not appear possible for the
United States to secure compliance with its own antitrust laws with
respect to the activities in question.
These same factors suggest that the act of state/sovereign compul-
sion defenses should be available in this context, if antitrust juris-
diction is exercised by the United States courts. The laws of Y
effectively compelled A to make this selection in the circumstances
described, and to hold A liable would require the court to pass on,
and reject, the validity of the governmental act of Y as a justifica-
tion for A's action. In these circumstances, it should probably not
be necessary for a court to reach the merits of an antitrust claim
arising from case two. If it did, however, much the same logic al-
ready advanced should serve to justify A's conduct under the rule
of reason.
The third case presents the most difficult analytical problem. The
EAA regulations indicate that this conduct, too, reflects permissible
compliance with local law by A's employees, who are residents of Y.
At the same time, the regulations caution that selections
"purportedly made by employees of U.S. companies who are resi-
dents in boycotting countries will be carefully scrutinized to ensure
that the discretion was exercised entirely in the boycotting coun-
try."56
No less caution is required in describing the applicability of the
antitrust laws to these facts. While the situation here is functionally
similar to the second case, the antitrust law precedents, unlike the
EAA, generally hold an employer responsible for the actions of its
employees within the scope of their employment.57 Accordingly, al-
' EAR § 369.3 (f-2), Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533-34 (1978).
"7 For example in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), the
appellate court, in upholding the imposition of criminal liability on a corporate defendant
for participating in an illegal boycott through its manager-purchasing agent (notwithstanding
specific corporate instructions to the agent not to participate), stated that "as a general rule
a corporation is liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of their
employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions to the
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though the results should be the same under both statutes, there
may be risks for United States corporations in this situation, even
under a rule of reason analysis, and it may be preferable from an
antitrust viewpoint to do such business through a subsidiary resi-
dent in the boycotting country.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding review suggests, the antiboycott rules of the
EAA represent, to a significant extent, the legislative development
of principles inherent in the antitrust laws as construed by the
courts. Thus, while the EAA does not preclude the application of
the antitrust laws to the conduct which it governs, the EAA clearly
represents a more sophisticated tool for the analysis of such con-
duct. Furthermore, courts would be wise to give careful considera-
tion to the rules of the EAA, as reflecting the deliberate judgment
of the executive and legislative branches of the government concern-
ing the difficult international legal and political questions posed by
the Arab boycott.
This approach to antitrust liability would appear to be consistent
with the evolving case law in this area, as well as with the evolving
concept of United States interests in regulating restrictive business
practices. The United States has, in recent years, become increas-
ingly aware of its economic interdependence with other countries
and of the necessity of working out common solutions to economic
problems.
In the antitrust area, the United States has placed increasing
emphasis on the development of an international consensus which
can be the subject of intergovernmental cooperation and, ulti-
mately, appropriate intergovernmental agreement.58 In light of this
emphasis on the need for an international consensus on the subject
of restrictive business practices, it would be especially unfortunate
if the courts of the United States were to adopt an approach to the
problem of the Arab boycott that was more aggressive and more
likely to offend foreign sovereigns than that arrived at by Congress
in its enactment of the EAA.
agent." Id. at 1007. See United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970).
See Joelson & Griffin, International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices En-
gaged in by Transnational Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT'L LAw. 5 (1977); Remarks by Joe
Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Before the Practising Law
Institute's 17th Annual Advanced Antitrust Law Seminar on International Trade and the
Antitrust Laws (Jan. 21, 1978).
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